Multilateral trade governance as social field: Global civil society and the WTO by Hopewell, Kristen
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multilateral trade governance as social field: Global civil society
and the WTO
Citation for published version:
Hopewell, K 2015, 'Multilateral trade governance as social field: Global civil society and the WTO' Review of
International Political Economy. DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2015.1066696
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1080/09692290.2015.1066696
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Review of International Political Economy
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
 Multilateral Trade Governance as Social Field:   
 
Global Civil Society and the WTO * 
 
 
Kristen Hopewell 
Lecturer in International Political Economy 
Department of Politics and International Relations 
University of Edinburgh 
15a George Square 
Edinburgh EH11 1SD 
kristen.hopewell@ed.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract:  The 1999 Seattle protests, which brought thirty thousand people to the streets in 
opposition to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and set off a series of other protests against 
the multilateral economic institutions, helped spark significant academic interest in global civil 
society and its potential to act as a transformative force in global economic governance.  In this 
article, however, I argue that many of the civil society actors that have sought to engage with and 
influence the WTO have been transformed in the process.  They have both become more 
technocratic and increasingly moved toward advocating positions that accord with the neoliberal 
trade paradigm.  I draw on Bourdieu’s field theory to explain why and how this transformation 
has occurred.  I argue that, in order to understand these changes among parts of civil society, we 
need to see multilateral trade governance as a social field, which civil society actors enter into as 
they seek to impact outcomes at the WTO.  The case of the WTO challenges existing theories 
that conceive of global civil society as an exogenous force that acts upon the institutions of 
global governance, showing instead that global civil society is not in fact independent or 
autonomous but shaped and influenced by the institution it targets. 
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 Introduction 
In 1999, thirty thousand protestors took to the streets of Seattle in opposition to a meeting 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) intended to launch a new round of trade negotiations.  
The WTO had come into force only four years before – as a successor to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) – but it had already generated an intense reaction from civil 
society.  As part of the global neoliberal turn, the creation of the WTO involved a significant 
expansion in supra-national authority and the scope of trade rules.  Civil society actors viewed 
the WTO as exclusionary and undemocratic and were concerned about the implications of its 
rules for a wide range of issues including development, inequality, the environment, labor and 
health.  Organized by a diverse network of social movements, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and trade unions, the Seattle protests closed the city’s downtown core for four days and 
disrupted the meetings of negotiators.  The “Battle of Seattle,” as it came to be known, served as 
a coming out party for the anti-globalization, or global justice, movement and set off a wave of 
protests at meetings of other international economic organizations – including the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the G8/G20 – around the world.   
These events sparked significant academic interest in global civil society and its potential 
to act as a transformative force in global economic governance.  In much of the existing 
literature, global civil society has been heralded as a democratizing force (Anheier 2004; 
Archibugi and Held 2011).  It has been seen as a source of counter-hegemonic resistance to the 
current path of neoliberal globalization (Gill 2008), with the potential to “tame” and “civilize” 
globalization (Kaldor 2000) or to usher in a new type of “globalization-from-below” (Falk 2014).  
Loaded with a broad set of ambitions and aspirations, as Ronaldo Munck (2004) observes, global 
civil society has taken on almost “mythical proportions.”  In the process, however, our 
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 understanding of actually-existing global civil society – as an analytical construct used to 
understand and interpret the social world – has been hampered by blurring with its normative 
ideal (Chandler 2007; Kenny and Germain 2005). 
This article contributes to our conception of actually-existing global civil society by 
examining the case of the WTO, a core institution in global governance.  Despite considerable 
theoretical interest in global civil society, there have been few empirical studies of how it 
actually engages with and works to influence the WTO.  Although there is a large literature on 
the relationship between the WTO and civil society, it has focused primarily on one pole of this 
dyad:  the WTO, its initiatives directed at civil society and the extent to which it has (or has not) 
been changed by this interaction (Hannah 2011; Howse 2003; Kapoor 2006; Mortensen 2003; 
Wilkinson 2005; Williams 2005).  Where the literature has turned to examine the other pole – 
global civil society – it has focused on the Seattle protests (Gill 2008; Halliday 2000; Kaldor 
2000; Levi and Olson 2000; Murphy and Pfaff 2005), with comparatively little attention to 
global civil society’s engagement with the WTO in the 15 years since then.  During this period, 
an incipient divide within civil society grew increasingly pronounced.  Although sharing the 
broad objective of advancing social justice, civil society actors have differed in their strategies 
regarding engagement with the WTO.  Some organizations made the decision to go “inside” the 
corridors of power, engage directly with trade officials, and lobby for change within the 
institution.  Others decided to stay “outside,” refusing to engage with the WTO, calling for its 
abolition, and working to construct alternatives to neoliberal globalization through initiatives 
such as the World Social Forum.  Scholte (2004) has characterized this as a split between 
“reformers” and “rejectionists”.  Within the politics of social change, the relative merits of, and 
tensions between, reformist and revolutionary approaches has been a topic of long-standing 
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 debate.  In the case of the contemporary global justice movement and its mobilization 
surrounding trade, the rejectionist camp has attracted considerable attention and academic 
research (Patomäki and Teivainen 2004; Santos 2006; Smith 2004).  However, we know far less 
about what has happened to the reformers attempting to effect change within the WTO. 
In this article, I focus the lens of analysis on civil society actors seeking to engage with 
and influence the WTO, examining their activities and interaction with the institution.  I argue 
that the dynamics of transnational advocacy directed at the WTO have changed dramatically 
since the iconic Seattle protests.  In the process of seeking to transform the WTO, many civil 
society actors have themselves been transformed:  they have both become more technocratic and 
increasingly moved towards advocating positions that accord with the dominant neoliberal trade 
paradigm.  I draw on Bourdieu’s field theory to explain why and how this transformation has 
occurred.  I argue that, in order to understand these changes among parts of civil society, we 
need to see multilateral trade governance as a social field, structured and stratified by power 
relations and the distribution of capital, which civil society actors enter into as they seek to 
impact outcomes at the WTO.  The case of the WTO challenges existing theories that conceive 
of global civil society as an exogenous force that acts upon the institutions of global governance, 
showing instead that global civil society is not in fact separate or autonomous but shaped and 
influenced by the institution it targets. 
Conceptualizing Global Civil Society and Global Governance 
Contemporary theorizing on global civil society is rooted in the concept of civil society,  
used to refer to the sphere of social interaction composed of associations and public 
communication, seen as a critical component of democratic society.  Civil society is most often 
conceptualized as a distinct social sphere, separate and autonomous from the state (Alexander 
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 2006:53; Taylor 1991; White 1994:379), or as an independent “third realm” differentiated from 
both the state and market (Kaldor 1999:200; Lipschutz 2007).  The concept is closely tied to the 
Habermasian notion of the public sphere, a site of public debate and deliberation, where public 
opinion is formed and then channeled to critique and shape governance.  Gramscian perspectives 
conceive of civil society as the sphere where the hegemony of ruling elites is enabled or 
disabled, such that it may be either “an agent of stabilization and reproduction” of the existing 
social order or “a potential agent of transformation.” (Cox 1999: 4-5) 
Extended to the global level, the concept of civil society has been used to capture the 
activity of non-state actors in global politics.  Scholars have been centrally concerned with the 
potential of global civil society to act as a transformative force.  It has been viewed as a source of 
alternative norms, values and discourses, giving voice to marginalized peoples and perspectives, 
broadening the range of issues and terms of debate, and serving as a key source of contestation in 
the global polity (Florini 2000; Kaldor 1999).  By generating alternative political discourses and 
debate, global civil society is seen as playing a central role in fostering deliberative democracy in 
global economic governance, challenging the workings of institutions like the WTO, IMF and 
World Bank, making them more responsive to popular concerns, and pushing for greater 
inclusivity, participation and accountability (Kapoor 2006). 
This idealized portrait has been criticized for glossing over issues of representation, 
accountability, legitimacy and unequal power relations within global civil society itself 
(Chandhoke 2002; Chandler 2007).  The argument made here differs, however, by challenging 
the premise that global civil society is a separate, independent sphere that acts upon the state (or 
at the global level, governance institutions like the WTO) and the market.  Instead, consistent 
with a Habermasian approach that recognizes the serious power deficits of civil society vis-à-vis 
   5 
 both the state and market and the resulting colonizing effects of the state and market on civil 
society, I argue that global civil society is not simply an exogenous force that acts upon the 
institutions of global governance, but profoundly influenced by the institution(s) it targets.   
I apply a theoretical framework informed by Pierre Bourdieu’s (1990; 2000) field theory.  
There is growing interest in applying Bourdieusian theory to international politics and law (see, 
for example, Adler-Nissen 2012; Berling 2012; Dezalay and Garth 2002; Go 2008; Pouliot 
2010), including in the realm of trade (Conti 2011; Eagleton-Pierce 2012; Evans and Kay 2008; 
Lang 2011).  There has also been new interest in applying the concept of field to the study of 
social movements, in order to improve our understanding of political opportunities – the 
possibilities and limitations social movements face in seeking to advance their concerns – and 
how the perceived viability of different strategies affects the choices of social movement actors 
(Evans and Kay 2008).  
Conceptualizing global governance as a social field in the Bourdieusian sense, I argue, 
provides a valuable means of capturing the terrain of contestation that surrounds any global 
governance institution, with various actors, endowed with different power resources, vying for 
recognition and influence.  In contrast to more traditional international relations concepts such as 
regimes (Krasner 1983; Ruggie 1982) or epistemic communities (Haas 1992), field theory places 
relations of power and conflict at the center of analysis, bringing into focus how power is 
constituted, contested and reproduced, as well as providing important tools to illuminate the 
complex processes of legitimation involved.  Field theory thus offers a useful lens for 
understanding the strategic practices of global civil society in seeking to influence global 
economic governance.  As Bourdieu stressed, a social actor cannot be understood in isolation, 
but must be viewed as embedded in a social space or field of social interaction.  A field is 
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 defined as an arena of struggle centered on a specific stake (Bourdieu 1993: 72).  A field is 
structured by the state of power relations among the agents within it, with the positions of social 
actors and their relationships determined by the distribution of capital, or resources (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992).  Capital can take a variety of forms, including economic, technical, 
scientific, political, military, cultural, social, or symbolic (Swartz 1997).1  Actors in dominant 
positions are able to wield power over the field as a whole and shape how different forms of 
capital are valued in that field (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008).   
Certain insights from field theory – related to the gatekeeping effects of capital, the 
centrality of recognition, and how these combine to produce specific forms of struggle within a 
field – are particularly relevant for studying the behavior of civil society in global governance.  
Capital is simultaneously a weapon and a stake of struggle, which “allows its possessors to wield 
a power, an influence, and thus to exist, in the field under consideration, instead of being 
considered a negligible quantity” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 98).  The capital that an actor 
possesses and how it is evaluated in that field defines their position in the hierarchy of the field 
(Berling 2012; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008).  But capital also performs an important 
gatekeeping function, serving to define and police the boundaries of the field:   
An agent may be deprived of the right to speak in the field … if certain types of 
capital are not possessed or certain ways of playing the game are not followed. … 
[T]he agent needs to be recognized as a player in a field in order to become one. 
(Berling 2012: 463) 
   
The boundaries of the field – who is recognized as having a legitimate claim to participate, or 
“right to exist” (Go 2008), in the field – are themselves an important subject of contestation and 
1 Technical capital refers to specialized knowledge, expertise and capabilities, often associated with professional or 
vocational skills (e.g., engineering, computer, legal, or accountancy expertise) 
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 struggle (Bourdieu 2004).  Possession of field-specific capital is necessary both for being 
accepted as a player in the field and optimizing one’s position within it.  
Field theory highlights the relational nature of power and the centrality of recognition 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96).  Capital has no intrinsic value of its own but “needs to be 
recognized as authoritative in a specific field in order to be valuable.”(Berling 2012: 455)  
Symbolic capital is the form “assumed by different kinds of capital when they are perceived and 
recognized as legitimate.”(Bourdieu 1990: 128)  Accumulating the specific forms of capital 
valorized within a field enables an actor to gain symbolic capital (legitimacy, recognition, 
esteem, authority) (Bourdieu 2000: 166).  The strategies that actors employ are thus “relational 
to the configuration and content of the field.”(Go 2008: 209)  Different fields provide distinct 
opportunities for certain strategies while denying others, depending upon the relative positions of 
players within it, the strategies of other players, and the modes of action valorized within that 
field.  “Entry into a field requires the tacit acceptance of the rules of the game, meaning that 
specific forms of struggle are legitimated whereas others are excluded.” (Swartz 1997: 125)  The 
field thus imposes specific forms of struggle; otherwise, one risks being ignored or discredited by 
other agents within the field.  
Drawing on field theory, I argue that civil society actors seeking to impact decision-
making within a global governance institution are forced to negotiate and respond to the 
opportunities and constraints that arise from the configuration of the field in which that 
institution is embedded, its power relations, institutional dynamics, and dominant ideology and 
modes of operating.  The dynamics of contestation within the field shape how different forms of 
capital are valued and thereby serve to legitimize certain behaviors, forms of knowledge, and 
ideas, while delegitimizing others.  For advocacy organizations, access to policymakers and the 
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 potential to influence global governance are tied to their ability to marshal the types of capital, or 
power resources, valued in these fields.  This creates considerable pressure on global civil 
society to adapt their behavior, discourse and advocacy positions to the dynamics of the field in 
which they are operating.   
The remainder of the paper explores in greater detail how field theory can be applied to 
better understand the relationship between global civil society and the global governance 
institutions, by examining the case of the WTO.  In this case, what is at stake in the field of 
multilateral trade governance – and thus what constitutes and defines it as a field (Bigo 2011) – 
is the struggle to shape the outcome of WTO negotiations and dispute settlement.  A multiplicity 
of actors – including states, the Secretariat, business lobbyists, civil society organizations and 
others (Lang 2011: 187) – are engaged in the battle over this stake, each endowed with different 
forms and amounts of capital.   
Data and Methods 
The study presented here employed a qualitative research design incorporating three 
sources of data:  in-depth interviews, direct observation, and documentary analysis.  Research 
was carried out primarily in Geneva, where the WTO is located, as well as in Washington, 
Ottawa, Montreal, New Delhi, Sao Paulo, Brasilia, and Beijing.  The Geneva-based interviews 
and observation took place from May-June 2007 and September 2008-June 2009; additional 
interviews at other sites were conducted over the period from July 2009-November 2010.  The 
interview sample consisted of 157 respondents, including 45 NGO representatives, 15 Secretariat 
officials, and 51 member-state delegates (ambassadors and trade negotiators).2  In total, 21 out of 
a universe of 22 NGOs with offices or significant activities in Geneva were interviewed.  While 
2 The remaining interviews involved trade officials in capitals, business representatives, and various other actors and 
observers.   
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 national-level and rejectionist groups were also interviewed in order to provide a larger picture of 
civil society contestation and advocacy related to trade, they are not the focus of the analysis 
presented here.  Instead, the analysis centers on those global civil society actors who have sought 
to engage directly with the WTO and influence its decision-making process. 
I also conducted over 300 hours of direct observation at events such as the annual WTO 
Public Forum; the UNCTAD Civil Society Forum; three major global civil society conferences 
on trade (in Ottawa, May 2007; Geneva, November 2008; and Montreal, November 2010); and 
numerous smaller conferences, workshops and strategy sessions organized by the Secretariat, 
states, or NGOs.  As many of these were key sites where NGOs sought to present their 
campaigns and messaging to Secretariat officials and negotiators, and vice versa, they provided 
an opportunity to observe the dynamics of this interaction, as well as the interaction among 
different civil society actors themselves.   
 In addition, I analyzed WTO documents pertaining to its relationship with civil society, 
such as public relations materials, information on its website, and internal memoranda and policy 
directives related to civil society, as well as similar documents produced by member-states.  This 
analysis included materials from WTO Public Forums – which provide an important snapshot of 
WTO-civil society relations – between 2001 and 2014.  I also examined advocacy campaign 
materials produced by civil society actors, including press releases, policy and position papers, 
websites, emails to supporters and other communications. 
Background:  The WTO and the Rise of Civil Society Activism 
The creation of the WTO marked the start of the neoliberal turn in the multilateral trading 
system (Mortensen 2003; Williams 2005).  While the GATT was a comparatively weak 
organization, with limited power over its membership and primarily concerned with reducing 
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 tariffs, the WTO expanded the scope of trade rules into new and more intrusive areas of domestic 
policymaking and created a dispute settlement mechanism that made its rules binding on states.  
Under the GATT, states were allowed considerable room to balance trade liberalization with the 
pursuit of other social and developmental objectives, whereas the WTO was explicitly designed 
to reduce those flexibilities.  Its purpose is to push forward neoliberal economic restructuring on 
a global scale – privatization, deregulation, protection of property rights, and the dismantling of 
restrictions on trade and capital flows – with the objective of liberating global market forces 
from the fetters of the state and facilitating the creation of a single, seamless global market.  It 
would, however, be inaccurate to characterize WTO rules as simply encoding neoliberal policy 
prescriptions for trade (Lang 2011).  Neoliberalism, at the WTO as elsewhere, contains 
significant contradictions and its adoption has been only partial and uneven.  In practice, WTO 
rules – the result of inter-state bargaining, shaped by power asymmetries among states and their 
efforts to avoid opening sensitive sectors of their own markets – have been highly selective, with 
extensive exceptions to liberalization, frequently skewed towards the interests of the powerful 
(Steinberg 2002).  
While the GATT was virtually unknown to the general public and attracted little attention 
from civil society, as the WTO’s authority expanded, it became a central target and rallying point 
for a diverse range of civil society actors.  Plans to begin a new round of negotiations to further 
expand and deepen its trade rules sparked intense opposition from global civil society, manifest 
in the Seattle protests.  Although the Seattle Ministerial collapsed due to disagreement among 
states, the Doha Round was nonetheless launched two years later.  With the launch of the round, 
political opportunities for civil society mobilization – and thus the strategies of many NGOs – 
changed markedly.  While civil society had been broadly united in opposing a new round of 
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 WTO negotiations at Seattle, as it became apparent in subsequent years that their efforts to block 
the round had failed, reformist NGOs shifted to seeking ways to influence the process and 
outcome of the negotiations.   
The Seattle protests drew unprecedented media and public attention to the WTO.  In 
response to criticisms that it lacked transparency and suffered from a democratic deficit, the 
WTO made limited moves towards increasing its interaction with global civil society, including: 
hosting an annual Public Forum, accepting amicus curiae briefs in dispute settlement 
proceedings, offering “online chats” with the Director-General, derestricting some documents 
and increasing information dissemination through its website.  Yet, there is no consultative 
mechanism for civil society and its access to the WTO remains severely constrained.  While the 
UN is comparatively open and responsive, the WTO – and other economic institutions such as 
the IMF and (to a lesser extent) the World Bank – have been far more restrictive and impervious 
to concerns raised by global civil society (Smith 2008).  
Global Civil Society in the Field of Multilateral Trade Governance  
As the following analysis will show, civil society actors have been forced to struggle 
simply for the right to exist in the field of multilateral trade governance.  Their ability to gain 
access to the field and be recognized as legitimate actors – and therefore have any chance of 
wielding influence – has depended upon their ability to mobilize necessary forms of field-
specific capital.  As Bourdieusian field theory underscores, their strategies must be understood in 
relation to the configuration and content of the field, which impose specific forms of struggle by 
providing opportunities for certain strategies while denying and excluding others.  This section 
turns to analyzing how the advocacy of civil society actors has been transformed as they have 
struggled to equip themselves with the forms of capital necessary to become accepted as players 
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 in this field and optimize their positions and influence within it.  Civil society actors have strived 
to gain symbolic capital (or legitimation, recognition, esteem and authority) within the field by 
building and deploying technical expertise and constructing their advocacy campaigns around 
positions and arguments that accord with the neoliberal trade paradigm, as well as working 
concurrently to accumulate social capital (contacts and networks) and political capital (the ability 
to attract potential allies).  
In seeking to enter the field of multilateral trade governance and influence decision-
making at the WTO, civil society actors must contend with the formal decision-making 
procedures and institutional structure of the WTO, as well as the informal “rules of the game” 
that emerge out of the dynamics of the field.  The field is centered on an elite and technocratic 
group of trade bureaucrats with a deep attachment to neoliberal ideology.  Trade negotiators and 
Secretariat officials tend to understand trade in narrowly economic terms, divorced from political 
questions and normative disputes (Howse 2002).  This has led to a privileging of the knowledge 
and authority of “experts” and resistance to what is seen as “political” interference in trade 
policymaking (Hannah 2011).  The result is a secretive culture of decision-making, with an 
absence of transparency and resistance to public engagement.   
Within the field of multilateral trade governance, neoliberal doctrine has the status of 
orthodoxy (Eagleton-Pierce 2012), supplying the fundamental, taken-for-granted assumptions 
about the economic and political world.  The goal of liberalizing trade and “freeing” markets is 
taken as natural and self-evident; it is treated as common sense (Siles-Brügge 2013).  Freeing 
market forces from “artificial” constraints – such as “barriers to trade” (increasingly broadly 
defined) – is believed to automatically and invariably generate increased efficiency and material 
well-being.  With implicit faith in the utility-maximizing nature of liberalization, trade officials 
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 are generally indifferent to questions related to the distribution of the benefits and burdens of 
trade liberalization or the effects of trade policies on other areas such as human rights, the 
environment, or health (Hannah 2011; Kapoor 2006).   
Efforts by civil society to influence the multilateral trading system have consequently 
been viewed with suspicion by trade officials.  Actors expressing criticism of trade liberalization 
or the WTO tend to be viewed as “special interest groups” who are either seeking to capture 
protectionist rents or are misguided and lack an accurate understanding of trade economics.  
Civil society interventions have historically been seen as troublesome and inappropriate 
intrusions into the proper domain of trade experts and a potential threat to the project of trade 
liberalization.  Although the WTO has put in place the limited mechanisms to engage with global 
civil society described earlier, there are no formal institutional channels for civil society 
consultation or input into the decision-making process and, indeed, there has been profound 
resistance to its involvement. 
For civil society actors, the field of multilateral trade governance is a “hostile field” 
(Evans and Kay 2008: 987).  The attitudes of trade officials towards civil society actors and the 
issues they raise are frequently dismissive, as evident in the comments of Secretariat officials:   
at the beginning the level of misunderstanding was just about, well, sky-high.  It 
was really almost 100%…  there was kind of a visceral reaction against [the 
WTO].  And we had things like the Seattle schmozzles and so forth – 
demonstrations of one kind or another, from people who basically believed it was 
all kinds of monstrous things.3 
 
it wasn’t our job [the WTO Secretariat’s] to kind of jump into the debate and say 
‘no, we don’t cause AIDS [laughs], and no, we’re not the cause of most of the ills 
of the world, and no, we’re not killing Indian farmers, and this is not our business, 
etc.’…  if they’re critical of it [the WTO], well that’s their right, but at least they 
should know what to criticize [laughs].4 
 
3 Interview, Geneva, July 2007. 
4 Interview, Geneva, June 2007.   
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 To trade officials, the arguments advanced by many civil society actors and their methods appear 
ridiculous – the product of a lack of “knowledge” or “understanding” of the WTO – or 
attributable to something more malicious.  A WTO Director-General, for example, in a speech 
opening the WTO’s first Public Forum for civil society, referred to the Seattle protesters as 
“mindless, undemocratic enemies of the open society” whose “slogans are trite, shallow and 
superficial.”(WTO 2001)  Such comments from trade officials demonstrate the “soft repression” 
(Ferree 2005) – the use of ridicule and stigma to delegitimize and silence – to which global civil 
society has been subject in this field.  As one Secretariat official acknowledged, NGOs have 
historically been “demonized” within the WTO.5     
Civil society actors seeking to engage in the field of multilateral trade governance start 
from a position severely lacking in power.  They have no official status or claim to participate in 
this field, as the WTO is officially an inter-state organization, where outcomes are the product of 
negotiations among states, supported by the Secretariat.  Moreover, not only are civil society 
actors in a subordinate position – lacking the official standing of states or another formal role or 
channel through which to influence decision-making – but their very right to exist in this field is 
denied or resisted by many of its other participants.  As the quotes above indicate, the initial 
strategies employed by civil society actors – street protests, normative claims to social justice, 
and broad criticism of the neoliberal trade agenda – were not recognized as valid forms of 
struggle in this field, with the result that they were largely ignored and discredited.  Their lack of 
the critical forms of capital valorized in the field – expert knowledge and positions grounded in 
the principles of neoliberalism – left civil society actors excluded and deprived of the right to 
speak in the field.  These sources of capital play a powerful gatekeeping role in defining the 
5 Interview, Geneva, March 2009.   
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 boundaries of participation.  Without such recognition, civil society’s power to influence the 
internal workings of the WTO was severely circumscribed. 
Marshalling Technical Expertise 
Civil society actors have faced an uphill battle to be seen as credible and legitimate actors 
in the field of multilateral trade governance.  This is, in their words, a struggle “to be taken 
seriously.”6  In this field, “seriousness” is viewed as a prerequisite for contributing to debates 
and deliberations over the appropriate design of multilateral trade rules, and its key marker is 
technical expertise.  The ability to mobilize expertise represents a critical form of capital for civil 
society actors seeking to access core actors in the field and be seen as legitimate participants and 
interlocutors; without it, they are not recognized as credible or legitimate and effectively blocked 
from participation.  As one respondent stated, unless they “master the technicalities of the 
negotiations” and “learn to talk to delegates at their level,” civil society actors face “a brick 
wall.”7  Marshalling technical expertise provides a point of entry – a way to penetrate the “brick 
wall” – and gain access to the field.   
This has driven many NGOs to become increasingly “technocratic” in their advocacy 
directed at the WTO, expanding their level of technical expertise and capacity, as well as their 
emphasis on these attributes (Hopewell 2009; Mably 2006).  Technical capacity includes in-
depth knowledge of trade law and economics and the ability to engage with WTO rules, legal 
texts, and negotiating documents, conduct legal and economic research and analysis, and make 
substantive policy proposals in the context of WTO negotiations and dispute settlement.  To 
provide an example, on the issue of tariffs – just one of many covered by WTO rules – NGOs 
have worked to develop the technical knowledge to engage with debates such as:  What 
6 This phrase appeared repeatedly in interviews. 
7 Interview, Geneva, June 2007. 
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 mechanisms should be used for determining tariff cuts in manufactured and agricultural goods, 
respectively?  If formulas, how should they be structured (e.g., Swiss, tiered, blended), what 
coefficients should be used, what flexibilities should be available and how should they be 
designed, should an anti-concentration clause be included, and should there be additional sectoral 
negotiations?  How should issues such as preference erosion and tariff escalation be addressed?  
What will be the impact in terms of real tariff cuts?  This is only one example of the technical 
expertise NGOs have cultivated across the broad range of issues involved in the Doha Round.   
An important part of “expertise” is being able to communicate in the language of the 
field.  Actors are not considered credible unless they speak the technical language of trade:  to 
quote one NGO representative, “if you don’t talk the language, you’ll look like you don’t know 
what you’re talking about and you won’t get real engagement [from officials].”8  However, the 
move by many NGOs towards adopting the technical language of trade bureaucrats and engaging 
in their debates has changed the nature of their advocacy – from articulating passionate and 
broad-based critiques of structural inequalities in the global economy and the damaging effects 
of trade liberalization and neoliberal policies to debating the design of a tariff reduction formula 
or safeguard mechanism.  In addition, the language of trade policy is not neutral but laden with 
the inherent biases of economic liberalism:  government regulation, for example, is a “non-tariff 
trade barrier” and any effort to limit “free” trade is labeled “protectionism.”  Adopting such 
language limits the terms on which civil society actors can engage in contestation.  At the WTO 
Public Forum, for example, the primary official venue for NGOs to interact with trade officials, 
words such as “neoliberalism” or “transnational corporation” (which would signal an outside 
paradigm) are virtually absent.   
8 Interview, Geneva, June 2007. 
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 Developing technical expertise has been essential for civil society actors to gain 
recognition within the field and battle its prejudices.  As one NGO respondent stated, the 
attitudes of trade officials towards NGOs have changed in recent years “as NGOs have gotten a 
little more sophisticated in their analysis and done a better job of toning down the rhetoric and 
replacing it with research.”9  Similarly, another NGO attributed what success it had achieved to 
the fact that:  “we showed that we’re technically competent, that we could speak their language, 
that we had rigor and substance, and that we weren’t just out there protesting.”10  Trade officials 
perceive a “great improvement” in civil society since Seattle “when it was just an outcry against 
globalization and the WTO” and report that the “level of sophistication of their understanding of 
the WTO” and the “quality of work done” has improved substantially.11  Due to this change, 
approved NGOs are now permitted to enter the WTO building, because, to quote one official, 
they have “calmed down… while previously it was ‘You mean these people that rioted in 
Seattle?  Give them access to the building?  No way.’”12  According to a Secretariat official, 
“now, our relationship with civil society – it’s professional, it’s substantial.  You still have a 
group of very critical civil society organizations, but it was 70% – now it is maybe 15% of civil 
society organizations that are critical.”13   
 There is a clear relationship between the attitudes and standards set by trade officials and 
the way many NGOs now work to define and differentiate themselves, as evident in the 
following statement from one NGO representative: 
I can’t speak for the NGO community, though, because I’m like a special animal, 
in that I’m never protesting, I’m wearing a suit when I go, I’m quite reasonable 
9 Interview, Geneva, June 2007. 
10 Interview, Geneva, June 2007. 
11 Interviews, Geneva, June - July 2007. 
12 Interview, Geneva, March 2009. 
13 Interview, Geneva, March 2009. 
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 and nice, you know.  There are some other NGOs who are maybe perceived as 
more troublemakers, or that kind of thing … there’s differences in NGOs.14 
 
Some NGOs are assimilating the technocratic standards of the field and turning those same 
standards of evaluation and criticism against other civil society actors.  This is apparent, for 
example, in the way many NGOs emphasize and contrast their ability to engage in hard 
“research” with the mere “rhetoric” of others.15  NGOs sound increasingly like trade officials as 
they criticize other civil society actors for not sufficiently “understanding what the WTO is 
about,” as one interview respondent stated.16  This is evident in a publication from Freidrich-
Ebert-Stiftung (FES), a German NGO with offices in Geneva, referring to various civil society 
actors in Mexico: 
Some NGO discussions of economic development strategies have been of low 
analytic content.  The WTO … is seen as an archetype of organizations that, like 
the IMF and the World Bank, are supposedly behind the advance of globalization, 
which is in turn blamed for a vast array of complaints such as low economic 
growth, environmental degradation, poverty, and unequal income distribution.  
They rarely present sound and systematic evidence to substantiate their claims.17  
 
Likewise, one prominent NGO publically disparaged large parts of global civil society as 
“globaphobes”, in order to set apart and contrast its own campaign.18  In this behavior, we can 
see these civil society actors struggling to assert their right to exist in the field and be received as 
legitimate participants by distinguishing themselves from other (less desirable, less adapted) 
elements of civil society.  Key actors within global civil society are thereby not only adapting to 
the technocratic standards dominant within the field of multilateral trade governance, but 
reproducing those standards of judgment.   
14 Interview, Geneva, June 2007. 
15 NGO representatives frequently drew this distinction. 
16 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
17 FES, “Mexico in the WTO Debate,” Briefing Paper, 2003. 
18 Oxfam’s “Rigged Rules and Double Standards”, 2002, p. 7. 
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 Allying with Recognized Actors 
Civil society actors have also struggled to increase their power in the field by building 
political capital, or cultivating alliances with other actors in the field – particularly states, who 
unlike civil society have official standing at the WTO and are seen as rightful actors within the 
field.  Forming alliances with states provides civil society with a greater set of opportunities to 
engage in the field and enhances their legitimacy and potential impact.  Yet the need to cultivate 
political capital within the field has further increased the pressure on global civil society to 
conform to its norms and standards of legitimacy by becoming more technocratic and neoliberal 
in their advocacy.     
For NGOs concerned with international development, part of their motivation to form 
alliances also stems from the desire to support developing countries in WTO negotiations 
(Hannah 2014; Scott 2014).  Many developing countries – particularly least developed countries 
(LDCs) – are severely under-resourced and suffer an acute lack of technical expertise; in other 
words, they are deficient in a key form of capital necessary to exert influence within this field.  
In part due to this lack of technical capacity, the last round of negotiations – the Uruguay Round 
concluded in 1994 – was highly unbalanced and imposed significant costs on developing 
countries (Gallagher 2008).  There have been concerns that this would be repeated in the current 
Doha Round.  This developing country capacity gap created a need that NGOs could help to fill.  
Many responded by taking on a role of supplying research and analytical capacity, policy and 
legal briefs, coordination, media talking points, messaging, and formal negotiating proposals for 
countries.  In interviews, negotiators indicated that “civil society has played a big role in working 
to inform LDCs of their rights in the WTO system and what their positions should be.”19  Their 
19 Interview, Geneva, February 2009. 
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 ability to marshal expertise to support developing countries has provided an important means for 
NGOs to get directly involved and influence the negotiations, and many NGOs now view this as 
one of their key roles.  NGO efforts to cultivate allies are not limited to developing countries; 
NGOs working in other areas – such as environmental groups – have also formed alliances with 
developed countries.  In fact, these ties have become so close that, in some instances, NGOs 
accompany negotiators from individual member-states at WTO Ministerial Meetings as part of 
their delegations.20 
Yet this role comes with considerable challenges.  At the time of Seattle, developing 
countries in particular were highly suspicious and mistrustful of NGOs, associating them with 
the issues of labor and environmental standards that they strongly opposed.  As a result, NGOs 
felt they “had to gain their trust.  And to do that we had to show them that we could be helpful – 
to show how we could support their agenda.”21  Now, expertise provides NGOs with something 
that they can offer to developing country delegations, but there are set parameters around this: 
Delegates know who they want to hear from … they’re not advocacy officers or 
public relations people; they are a lawyer or technical expert who happens to be 
working for a particular NGO.  Delegates are not looking for positions or 
statements.  They’re looking for technical or legal inputs.22 
 
NGOs have increased their access to trade officials by de-emphasizing advocacy and instead 
emphasizing their specialist research, policy, and technical capacity.  They effectively have had 
to disguise the fact they are doing advocacy:  as one stated, “part of the reason we were effective 
was because delegates didn’t feel we had an agenda.”23  The need to accumulate political capital, 
20 Reported in interviews with negotiators and civil society, September 2008-June 2009. 
21 Interview, Geneva, March 2009. 
22 Interview, NGO representative, Geneva, June 2007.  
23 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
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 or allies, within the field of multilateral trade governance has thus further contributed to changes 
in the nature of civil society advocacy. 
Cultivating Professional Networks 
The need to accumulate social capital has had a similar effect.  WTO negotiations and 
dispute settlement are highly secretive, occurring behind closed doors with limited information 
available to the public.  Consequently, NGOs are dependent on cultivating social capital – 
networks of personal relationships with core actors in the field such as WTO negotiators and 
Secretariat officials – to gain accurate and up-to-date information about what is occurring within 
the institution.  In addition to being an important source of information, in the absence of formal 
channels for consultation, such relationships are also a key source of access to decision-makers.  
NGOs stressed the importance of building relationships of trust and confidence with trade 
officials: 
it’s all relationships … that’s why you have to be careful what you say, who you 
attribute what you say to, how you present yourself, all that stuff.  It’s very 
personal relationship-based here, very diplomacy-oriented …. Everything here is 
relationship-building.24 
 
Trade officials confirmed the centrality of personal relationships in their engagement with civil 
society actors:  
the ones here, we build up very close relationships with them.  You can get to 
know them privately, have a drink with them, talk to them.  You can separate 
personal from professional identities.  People get to know you on a personal level.  
You can establish relations in Geneva.25  
 
However, the need to build such relationships intensifies the pressure on civil society to become 
more like the actors they are targeting, to gain acceptance and esteem by displaying technical 
expertise and positions in accordance with the neoliberal trade paradigm.  As a result, civil 
24 Interview, Geneva, June 2007. 
25 Interview, Secretariat official, Geneva, March 2009. 
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 society actors have increasingly come to resemble trade officials in their behavior and discourse.  
Indeed, the gap between many NGOs and trade officials has narrowed to such an extent that it is 
now common for personnel to move between positions working for NGOs, the WTO Secretariat 
and state delegations, which would have been improbable at the time of Seattle.26  While 
developing social capital enables civil society actors to operate more effectively within the field, 
the necessity of fostering and maintaining their relationships with trade officials also constrains 
their ability to engage in critique.   
Shifting to Neoliberal Advocacy Positions 
The same pressures that have led many civil society organizations to strive to develop 
technical expertise have driven a parallel shift in the substance of their advocacy, as part of their 
efforts to gain symbolic capital, or legitimacy, and combat their exclusion from the field.  NGOs 
identify a range of issues, including labor protections, tariff cuts for developing countries, and 
agricultural subsidies, on which they have weakened their advocacy stances.  Moreover, many 
have ceased to publically question the WTO’s objective of trade liberalization.  NGOs have 
generally shifted from broader positions of opposition to trade liberalization to more targeted 
positions, and often the issues they have decided to focus on – and where they have received the 
most favorable reception – are ones that fit within the neoliberal trade paradigm, by seeking 
further trade and market liberalization as a means of pursuing development, environmental and 
other objectives.  Again, as with the turn to technical expertise, we see how the field shapes the 
26 For example, a former trade negotiator for an African state joined the staff of Oxfam, and later the Secretariat; 
another Oxfam staffer went on to work for a leading international trade law firm; several negotiators and Secretariat 
officials have gone on to work for ICTSD; staff from ICTSD have gone on to work for the Secretariat; and several 
NGOs have been created by former negotiators (Iqsensato, IDEAS Centre, CUTS Geneva).   
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 nature of civil society advocacy by creating distinct opportunities for certain strategies while 
denying others.  As one NGO representative stated, “we move where we see openness.”27 
One of the issues, for example, where NGOs have had most success is fisheries subsidies, 
in a campaign led by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF).  WWF had been active since the 1990s in 
trying to draw attention to the negative effects of trade liberalization and WTO rules on the 
environment.  But by the start of the Doha Round in 2001, it had significantly restructured its 
campaign.  According to a representative, the organization stopped engaging on a number of 
issues “because we felt we weren’t going to get what we wanted in terms of outcomes and we 
wanted to see where we really could have an impact.”  It came to realize “the benefits of 
specializing” in seeking to use the WTO to reduce fisheries subsidies, which contribute to 
overfishing and depletion of fish stocks.28  The fisheries subsidies issue was “more concrete” and 
looked like “an easy sell” because it fit neatly within the neoliberal paradigm (which opposes 
subsidies as a violation of the free market principles of economic efficiency and 
competitiveness) and could therefore attract support within the WTO:  
We saw convergence.  Subsidies reform is a core WTO business and it provided 
something tangible that the WTO could do on the environment.  We thought we 
could provide them with green political cover – a way for the WTO to play a role 
in sustainable development.29   
 
The subsidies issue also provided the opportunity for WWF – along with Greenpeace, Friends of 
the Earth, Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL) and other environmental NGOs 
who have embraced the issue – to form alliances with other actors in the field, specifically states 
and national industries with low levels of subsidization (e.g., the US and the other members of 
the “Friends of Fish” group) who have an interest in seeking to reduce the subsidies provided by 
27 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
28 Interview, Geneva, April 2009. 
29 Ibid. 
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 their competitors (Japan, China).  By the standards of most civil society interaction with the 
WTO, this strategy was highly effective:  fisheries subsidies were designated a special item in 
the negotiations; the NGOs indicate that they have found “some of our footprint and some of our 
language” reflected in states’ negotiating proposals; and WTO officials frequently point to the 
issue as evidence of the organization’s openness to civil society.30   
Another example is the issue of reducing rich country agricultural subsidies and 
improving developing country access to these markets.  Oxfam, the international development 
NGO, is a key proponent of this issue.  Previously, Oxfam had been part of a group of civil 
society actors demanding that the authority of the WTO be rolled back and opposing the launch 
of a new round of negotiations.  However, with the launch of its Make Trade Fair campaign in 
2002, Oxfam’s approach changed significantly, embracing agricultural trade liberalization in rich 
countries as a key means of fostering poverty reduction and development (Ilcan and Lacey 
2006).  Oxfam’s new campaign was “welcomed” by the WTO Director-General, who applauded 
its “sound arguments” (WTO 2002), along with other neoliberal advocates such as The 
Washington Post (2002), which praised Oxfam’s “break with its [anti-globalization] allies” in 
showing “uncharacteristic support for free-market economics” and “throwing its considerable 
prestige behind the pro-trade agenda.”  Like the environmental NGOs mentioned above, Oxfam 
was also able to capitalize on divisions among different actors in the field to form alliances; it 
has worked closely with West African cotton producing countries, as well as with Brazil and its 
export-oriented agribusiness sector who are interested in reducing subsidies in its primary 
competitors, the US and EU (Eagleton-Pierce 2012; Hopewell 2013).  Oxfam is not alone but 
one of many NGOs – including the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP), CUTS 
30 Ibid. 
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 International, IDEAS Centre, International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development 
(ICTSD), ActionAid, Quaker United Nations Organization (QUNO), Agency for Co-operation & 
Research in Development (ACORD) and Third World Network – who have adopted the issue of 
agricultural subsidies and market access as a central aspect of their advocacy campaigns. 
A further area that many NGOs have increasingly focused on is GATS Mode 4, the 
temporary migration of labor across borders to supply services.  The campaign surrounding 
Mode 4 fits neatly with the principles of neoliberalism, which would demand free trade in all 
goods and factors of production, including labor.  Despite progressive liberalization in other 
areas of the global economy, labor mobility remains highly restricted with little liberalization 
under the GATT/WTO or elsewhere.  During the Doha Round, many NGOs – alongside actors 
such as the Secretariat and the World Bank – began actively promoting labor “exports” as a 
means for poor countries to foster economic growth and development.  Given their low wages 
and large labor supplies, this has been framed as an area where developing countries have a 
competitive advantage and could therefore make major gains from liberalization in the Doha 
Round.  Not surprisingly, calls for Mode 4 liberalization have met with strong resistance from 
the US and other Northern states, which are its prime targets.  NGOs – including ICTSD, 
QUNO, Oxfam, IDEAS Centre and the Overseas Development Institute – have supported 
developing countries in seeking expanded market access under Mode 4, emphasizing the 
significant economic value of remittances supplied by migrant labor working abroad and 
presenting labor exports as a solution to the development challenges faced by poor countries.  In 
a public presentation at a WTO symposium, for example, Oxfam heralded Mode 4 as presenting 
   26 
 a “great opportunity,” potentially “giving developing countries an opportunity to exploit labor as 
an abundant resource.”31   
Critics, however, point out that Mode 4 trade raises serious concerns related to the 
welfare of temporary labor migrants, their vulnerability to exploitation and violations of their 
human rights, and the racialized and gendered nature of such “trade” (Broude 2010; ).  One could 
argue that the framing of labor exports as a path to development – embraced and propagated by 
many NGOs – represents the ultimate embodiment of the commodifying logic of global 
neoliberalism:  reducing human beings to tradable commodities to be exported by states as a 
development strategy.  Yet, this is an issue that many influential NGOs have thrown their weight 
behind – organizing briefings to publicize the economic benefits of Mode 4 trade, 
commissioning and disseminating research and proposals for how it could be operationalized in 
the Doha Round, and running strategy sessions for developing countries and LDCs on how to 
overcome resistance from Northern states.  This activity by NGOs has played an important role 
in helping to promote and legitimize the framing of temporary migration as a trade issue and in 
providing technical support to developing countries on the issue.   
NGOs have chosen to focus their advocacy on issues like agricultural and fisheries 
subsidies and Mode 4 because these are issues on which their demands accord with the dominant 
values of the field.  NGOs recognize that being able to appeal to the pro-liberalization orientation 
of the field provides a “compelling story”32 and “helps to push the issue up on the agenda.”33  
Conversely, issues that involve restricting market liberalization are received negatively and fail 
31 Presentation by Joy Katagekwa, Oxfam International, “Economic Implications of Mode 4 Trade,” at WTO 
Symposium on Mode 4, September 2008. 
32 Interview, NGO representative, Geneva, June 2009. 
33 Interview, Geneva, April 2009. 
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 to gain the same kind of legitimacy.  The barriers involved in trying to advance such issues have 
caused many NGOs to move away from them, as one representative explained:     
At the beginning, we tried to think about how we could promote an alternative 
vision for the international trading system and really shift the track it is on.  But 
over time we realized that wasn’t in our reach – there’s little appetite for 
significant reform.  So we have focused on where change is likely to happen.34   
 
The respondent indicated that the NGO had initially wanted to advance several issues related to 
global trade regulation that it considered important, including policies to address market 
concentration and the power of transnational corporations and commodity agreements to raise 
incomes for developing country producers: 
But we didn’t think these issues were going to go anywhere at the WTO.  They 
are totally contrary to the basic philosophy of the WTO, which is to free markets 
from government intervention...  So instead we pursued other issues [like 
agricultural subsidies] that we thought were more feasible. 
 
Although many NGOs began with aspects of their campaigns that accorded less neatly with a 
neoliberal framework, these have fallen to the background as the pro-liberalization elements 
have taken prominence.   
While the engagement of WTO negotiators and Secretariat officials with global civil 
society has increased, it remains highly selective – skewed towards actors and issues that fit 
within and support their own agendas (Wilkinson 2005).  As one Secretariat official indicated:  
They [NGOs] can say things we can’t.  Like on agriculture subsidies, there’s no 
one in this organization [the Secretariat] that likes them, but we couldn’t say that 
because we can’t criticize our members.  We couldn’t say that in the beginning, 
but now [because of the work of NGOs on the issue] we can say that in a meeting 
and no one will oppose you.  Everyone pretty much agrees they’re bad.35 
 
From the perspective of the WTO Secretariat, the work of NGOs has been instrumental in 
drawing media attention, mobilizing public support and cementing a widespread consensus on 
34 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
35 Interview, Geneva, March 2009. 
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 the need to reduce agricultural subsidies (Margulis 2010), which has helped add considerable 
fuel to the liberalization project.  Other actors in the field – whether states, business actors or the 
Secretariat – are engaged in their own struggles; they too are seeking symbolic capital to enhance 
their power and ability to achieve their desired outcomes in WTO negotiations and dispute 
settlement.  Such actors are eager to ally with and promote the campaigns of civil society actors 
when it legitimates and strengthens their own positions and objectives. 
The dynamics of the field legitimate and reward certain forms of struggle – elevating the 
prominence of civil society actors and campaigns that correspond with its technocratic and 
neoliberal values – while delegitimizing and thrusting others to the margins.  Oxfam, for 
example, is now likely the most prominent and influential NGO in the field; embraced by the 
Secretariat, many developing countries and the media, it now often features centrally in WTO 
events, such as the Public Forum, and has become the primary NGO cited in media coverage of 
the WTO.  Oxfam is put forward as representing the voice of global civil society, even though 
some elements of civil society reject its pro-trade stance.  It is also the pro-liberalization 
elements of Oxfam’s campaign – its calls to “make trade work for the poor” and “level the 
playing field” by reducing trade barriers and distortions in rich countries – that have attracted 
attention.  Initially, Oxfam’s campaign included other more critical elements – such as calls for 
the creation of an international commodity institution and a global anti-trust mechanism36 – but 
these were largely ignored, with the result that Oxfam eventually came to make little mention of 
these proposals in its advocacy.  Similarly, while some NGOs, such as ActionAid, Oxfam and 
IATP, began with a broader critique of WTO intellectual property rules – arguing that they 
would severely undermine the ability of poor countries to develop and require a massive income 
36 See, for example, “Oxfam's response to Walden's Bello's Article on Make Trade Fair,” May 2, 2002. 
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 transfer from the Global South to North – over time many of these arguments largely fell by the 
wayside, as what came to the fore of their campaigns was a much more limited and narrow 
agenda of securing exemptions to ensure access to medicines.  In the process, attention to more 
fundamental problems with the TRIPs agreement and questions about its legitimacy were 
brushed aside, leaving the agreement now securely entrenched and unchallenged.  In another 
example, while environmental groups encountered a receptive audience for their advocacy 
against fisheries subsidies, concerns raised by some of the same organizations, such as 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, that trade liberalization could increase pressure on fish 
stocks, were ignored by trade officials.  When civil society actors advance arguments that depart 
significantly from the dominant values of the field, they are likely to be deemed irrelevant and 
simply ignored. 
Even where NGOs have been seemingly most successful in advancing more heterodox 
ideas and agendas, they are still highly constrained by the orthodoxy of the field.  This is evident, 
for example, in NGO efforts to help developing countries – represented by the Group of 33 
(G33) – secure flexibilities to protect their agriculture sectors in the Doha Round.  To promote 
food security and protect rural livelihoods, the G33 has sought a “special products” (SPs) 
exemption that would allow developing countries to shield some products from tariff cuts, a 
“special safeguard mechanism” (SSM) that would allow them to raise tariffs in response to an 
import surge and, most recently, under India’s leadership, changes to WTO subsidy rules to 
enable developing countries to engage in public food stockholding.  Due to strong opposition 
from the US, these have been among the most contentious issues in the negotiations – the SSM 
was a central factor in the breakdown of the 2008 Ministerial, while food stockholding nearly 
prevented agreement on, and subsequently adoption of, the 2013 Bali Package ( Wilkinson, 
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 Hannah, and Scott 2014).  With extensive support from NGOs, the G33 has ensured that the 
SSM and SPs will be part of any final Doha agreement and secured an interim due restraint 
mechanism making food stockholding immune from WTO challenges (Eagleton-Pierce 2012; 
Margulis 2013).  NGOs – such as ICTSD, TWN, Focus on the Global South, Oxfam and the 
Catholic Agency for Overseas Development – have played an essential role in advancing these 
issues.  NGO advocacy has helped to enhance recognition of the food security concerns of 
developing countries, while undermining powerful opponents such as the US (Eagleton-Pierce 
2012).  Particularly since the G33 lacks its own internal research capacity, high-quality research 
and technical analysis provided by NGOs – especially ICTSD – has been critical to legitimizing 
the G33 and boosting its credibility (Mably 2009).   
Yet, as Eagleton-Pierce (2012) discusses, while these accomplishments are far from 
trivial, this is a considerable distance from where the initial civil society campaigns that helped 
to put these issues on the agenda at the WTO began.  Many of the key civil society actors 
involved started from a radical stance critiquing the negative impacts of the liberal trading 
regime on global food security.  Over time, however, the “full heretical force” of their initial 
critique “has been partially sidelined or lost as the negotiations shifted into conventional 
bargaining” over market access demands and NGOs became embroiled in highly technical 
debates about how (relatively narrow) instruments like the SSM and SPs would be designed and 
operationalized (Eagleton-Pierce 2012: 145).  From condemning the orthodox trade vision, NGO 
advocacy has instead shifted to struggling “within the confines of WTO categories and rules to 
reduce potential harmful effects of liberalizing trends for poor farmers.”(Eagleton-Pierce 2012: 
121)  Although measures such as the SSM and SPs deviate from the strict dictates of 
neoliberalism – by creating some very limited exceptions to liberalization for developing 
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 countries – this is far from unusual within the GATT/WTO system, which has always contained 
various exemptions and safeguards to allow states to protect sensitive sectors (Messerlin and 
Woolcock 2012).  Such exemptions have been considered integral to the functioning of the 
system, an “escape clause” or “safety valve” enabling the larger project of liberalization to move 
forward.  Thus, the G33 agenda supported by many NGOs represents, at most, a rather weak 
critique:  while it departs from the neoliberal orthodoxy, it does so only in a very limited way – 
and one that makes sense to, and fits within, the longstanding workings of the multilateral 
trading system (Eagleton-Pierce 2012).  
Internal Debates and Struggles within Global Civil Society 
Of those civil society actors seeking to engage with the WTO, the most successful – in 
terms of their ability to access the field and be received as legitimate players within it – have 
increasingly moved towards more technocratic forms of advocacy, closer relationships with 
policymakers, and campaigns that resonate with the dominant values and orientation of the field.  
Civil society actors who have successfully affected this transformation have risen to prominence 
and been brought closer to the center of power.  Such actors are increasingly assuming the role of 
“insiders” – accepted members of the trade community surrounding the WTO.  They have 
intentionally cultivated the forms of capital valued in this field and demonstrated an ability and 
willingness to adapt to its norms, gaining greater inclusion and influence as a result.  However, 
not all civil society actors are equally willing or able to make such a shift.  As one NGO 
respondent observed, this is “good for some NGOs and civil society groups and not good for 
others.”37  The increased interaction between the WTO and civil society has generally been 
37 Interview, June 2007. 
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 limited to a core group of technically-savvy, well-resourced, Geneva-based NGOs, while large 
segments of civil society remain outside such interaction.   
There are, for instance, civil society actors who would like to engage with and have a 
voice in debates and deliberations at the WTO but remain highly marginalized within this field, 
including many grassroots, national- or regional-level NGOs, often based in the Global South.  
Without an office in Geneva, these organizations are far removed from what is occurring at the 
WTO; they often lack the information, research capacity and technical sophistication to engage 
with the specifics of WTO negotiations and may be less technocratic and more political in their 
approach.  One Southern NGO, for example, recognizing the importance of a presence in 
Geneva, opened an office there for a brief period, but was soon forced to close it due to the high 
costs involved.38  Many developing country delegates indicate that their domestic NGOs lack the 
technical capacity to supply them with useful inputs for the negotiations (such as an analysis of 
the impact of different tariff and subsidy proposals, or a specific design of the SSM) – and 
which, instead, they rely on the major Geneva-based NGOs to provide.39  Many grassroots 
NGOs express criticism of this intense emphasis on technical expertise and the crowding-out of 
more political approaches; as one representative of an African NGO aptly expressed it, “you 
don’t need the technical language to say ‘this isn’t fair’.”40   
There has also been considerable debate and controversy within civil society over the 
pro-liberalization stance taken by many of the major Geneva-based NGOs.  This has played out 
most publically in debates surrounding Oxfam’s Make Trade Fair campaign, with some civil 
society actors strongly critical of Oxfam’s emphasis on “unlocking” the potential of trade to “lift 
38 Interview with NGO representative, January 2009. 
39 Interviews, Geneva, September 2008-June 2009. 
40 Civil society conference, Geneva, November 2008. 
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 the poor out of poverty.”41  Walden Bello, for example, Executive Director of Focus on the 
Global South, criticized Oxfam for promoting “the paradigm of export-oriented growth,” as “the 
wrong focus and wrong direction for the movement against corporate-driven globalization,” 
arguing that instead “the central problem is the paradigm of free trade that the WTO is 
relentlessly imposing on the global trading system.”42  Even within Oxfam, the pro-liberalization 
stance of its campaign generated considerable internal division, including prompting the 
resignation of a senior trade advisor in protest.43   
While not surprising that Oxfam has received significant attention, given its status as one 
of the world’s largest and most prominent NGOs, its position is far from unique:  the cause of 
improving agriculture market access and reducing subsidies has been near-universally embraced 
by the major NGOs.  There are other civil society actors – particularly in the rejectionist camp – 
who oppose this stance.  Rather than seeing trade liberalization as a potential engine of economic 
development, many in the food sovereignty movement, for instance, fundamentally oppose the 
Doha Round and refuse to recognize the WTO’s authority in agricultural governance.  From the 
perspective of Via Campesina, for example, a global peasant movement, “the WTO is a 
fundamentally flawed institution that bends the economic playing field in favor of developed 
countries and large MNCs at the cost of the livelihoods of the poor … agriculture has no place in 
the WTO.”44  Thus, the movement by some organizations toward advocacy strategies and goals 
that accord with the dominant technocratic and neoliberal values of the field of multilateral trade 
41 “Rigged Rules and Double Standards,” 2002. 
42 Bello, Walden. "What’s Wrong with the Oxfam Trade Campaign." Open letter, April 26, 2002. 
43 Interview, Geneva, September 2008. 
44 La Via Campesina, “India – Farmers Support GOI’s pro-Farmer position at WTO, call for Agriculture out of 
WTO,” August 21, 2014. 
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 governance is far from universal and has been the subject of considerable contestation and 
struggle within civil society. 
Conclusion 
The case of the WTO highlights the opportunities and challenges faced by global civil 
society in trying to engage with and influence global economic governance.  Through this case 
study, I have argued that global civil society is not an independent or exogenous force in global 
governance, but shaped and influenced by the institution it targets.  Drawing on Bourdieu’s field 
theory, I have shown that many key civil society actors seeking to participate in the field of 
multilateral trade governance have been drawn towards increasingly technocratic and neoliberal 
forms of advocacy.  Field theory helps us to understand this shift by seeing the strategic practices 
of these civil society actors as relational to the logic of the field in which they seek to operate.  
The changes described here – from protesting in the streets dressed in turtle costumes holding 
placards stating “Stop the WTO” to wearing suits in the hallways of the WTO headquarters in 
Geneva, wielding briefing notes based on econometric modeling and legal analysis, with 
arguments about how trade liberalization serves to aid poor farmers or conserve ocean fisheries, 
and building professional relationships with trade officials and alliances with states – all 
illustrate how the field has imposed certain forms of struggle.  The strategies of civil society 
actors have been guided by the forms of capital valued in the field and its invisible “rules of the 
game.”  Civil society actors have strived to gain access to the field and recognition as legitimate 
actors by equipping themselves with its prime sources of symbolic capital – technical expertise 
and neoliberal argumentation – and cultivating social and political capital in the form of 
professional networks and alliances with recognized actors in the field.  In doing so, they are 
struggling against the gatekeeping forces working to exclude them from the field and seeking to 
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 increase the likelihood that their interventions will be successful and have an impact on the 
WTO.    
Many (reformist) civil society actors have successfully managed to become players in 
this field by adapting to its logic.  Yet one consequence is that their tacit acceptance of this logic 
legitimates and reinforces the continued exclusion of other actors who are unwilling or unable to 
conform to the demands of the field and marshal its requisite forms of capital.  Moreover, their 
advocacy efforts are increasingly operating within the dominant trade paradigm rather than 
challenging it and thereby becoming a source of legitimation for efforts to continue the 
liberalization of global markets.  Bourdieusian field theory thus offers important insight into the 
mechanisms by which the transformative potential of civil society is suppressed and it instead 
comes to play an important role in stabilizing and reproducing the hegemony of neoliberalism in 
the existing social order. 
The Doha Round has now been at an impasse since the 2008 Ministerial, due to a 
stalemate between traditionally dominant states (the US and EU) and emerging challengers 
(China, India and Brazil) (Hopewell 2015).  With the apparent breakdown of the round, civil 
society interest and activity surrounding the WTO has waned considerably (Oxfam, for example, 
did not even send a representative to the 2013 Bali Ministerial, deciding “there was just not 
enough on the table to merit the travel and expense”),45  although certain NGOs, such as ICTSD, 
IATP, TWN, and the IDEAS Centre, remain actively engaged, particularly with the 
intensification of negotiating activity surrounding the Bali Ministerial and its aftermath.  While 
the future of the round is uncertain, negotiations continue and the WTO’s existing rules and 
dispute settlement procedures remain in force and actively in use.  Meanwhile, a substantial 
45 Oxfam blog post by Romain Benicchio, Senior Policy Advisor, “The WTO tries to prove it is relevant, but for 
whom?,” December 3, 2013.  
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 amount of negotiating activity has moved to bilateral and regional trade agreements, such as the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, and 
others.  Given the potential significance of these agreements, understanding the role and impact 
of civil society in these emerging areas of global trade regulation, and how the dynamics of their 
advocacy compare to the WTO, represents an important avenue for future research.   
Although this study has focused on the governance of international trade, there are also 
reasons to expect many of the same dynamics to be present in other arenas of global economic 
governance.  As Alison Van Rooy (2004) argues, contests over legitimacy – what she terms the 
“global legitimacy game” – are an important element of contemporary debates about 
globalization; ultimately, what is at stake is a struggle over who gets to shape the rules that 
govern the global political economy.  Since different governance fields have distinct 
constellations of actors, power dynamics, and privileged forms of capital, the specific measures 
of legitimacy and how they affect civil society may vary.  But, the conditions we observe in the 
field of multilateral trade governance – the privileging of expertise, economistic discourses, and 
neoliberal ideology – are far from unique to that institution, suggesting that many of the same 
pressures on global civil society identified here are likely to be at work beyond the WTO.  
Global economic governance institutions now routinely trumpet the importance and value 
of their interactions with civil society.  However, this study suggests the need to look critically at 
these claims and the interactions that underlie them.  The case of the WTO demonstrates how the 
transformative potential of global civil society – its ability to introduce alternative discourses and 
perspectives into debates and deliberations, broaden participation, and foster global democracy – 
can be inhibited by the global governance institutions themselves and the dynamics of the fields 
in which they are situated.   
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